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by Zoltán Papp* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper discusses the rules of international law regarding the use of force against civil aircraft 
in the interpretation of states in their written submissions presented to the International Court 
of Justice. Some of the findings herein described were presented by this author on 11 December 
2015 in Győr (Hungary) at the conference for PhD students entitled uniqueness of 
jurisprudence—organized by the Postgraduate Doctoral School of Law and Political Sciences 
of Széchenyi Egyetem.   
This paper is structured as follows: in the second section, following the introductory remarks, 
the research methodology is outlined; the third section contains general observations with 
respect to the subject matter; the fourth section examines the destruction of a civil aircraft during 
peace time (1955) over Bulgarian airspace—an issue that was one of the first major well 
documented incidents of the use of armed force against a civil flight.1 In addition, this latter 
section discusses a more recent aerial incident (1988) concerned with the destruction of an 
Iranian civil aircraft that occurred against the backdrop of an international armed conflict 
extended to the Persian Gulf. The Iranian incident arose after the adoption, but prior to entry 
into force, of the first international convention banning the use of force against civil aircraft 
(Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention). In the fifth and final section an attempt is made to 
draw some conclusions in order to shed some light on the impact of state submissions discussed 
in this paper have had on the eventual formulation of the relevant rules governing international 
law. Moreover, contemporary developments and challenges will briefly be presented.   
The states’ written submissions (memorials) subject to analysis in this paper are all the more 
relevant today as they eventually contributed to the codification of customary international law 
and may, by the same token, contribute to a better understanding of current developments and 
challenges.  
All references to the Chicago Convention refer to the “Chicago Convention on international 
civil aviation (1944)”,2 whereas the term Montreal Convention refers to the “Montreal 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (1971)”.3 
 
 
                                                          
*Phd Student Pázmány Péter Catholic University Budapest and in-house legal counsel at HungaroControl Pte. Co. 
Ltd. The views expressed in this paper by the author are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of his 
employer. 
1 Two other noteworthy international incidents preceded the above mentioned Bulgarian related ICJ case; namely, 
an aerial attack on an Air France flight by Soviet MIGs over East Germany (1952) and the shooting down of a 
scheduled Cathay Pacific Airways flight by Chinese combat aircraft (1954). In the case of the first, the aircraft 
ultimately managed to carry out an emergency landing in Berlin. In the case of the second incident, China assumed 
full responsibility for mistaking the British aircraft for a Chinese nationalist enemy military aircraft. For more 
details see: William J. Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the use of force, 45 J. Air L. & Com. 595, 
1979-1980, pp. 600-602. 
21944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc 7300/9, Ninth Edition 2006 
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf (14 February 2016). 
3 Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation concluded at Montreal 23 
September, 1971. No. 14118. https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv3-english.pdf (16 February 2016). 
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2. Adopted research methodology 
 
The written positions and arguments provided by states were examined. Specifically, those that 
were submitted to the ICJ in the form of applications instituting proceedings, memorials, 
preliminary objections. The overall objective being to identify what the relevant international 
law is, including indications of relevant state practice and opinio iuris. An additional objective 
being to discover how states interpret and implement relevant international conventions and 
norms. 
However, such an approach to research has a number of limitations since to date, the ICJ has 
never delivered any judgement with respect the merits of any aerial incident case—and in light 
of the fact that, relatively speaking, only a small number of states are involved in such cases. 
The official web-site of the International Court of Justice was used to find and analyse states’ 
written submissions to the ICJ.4  
 
 
3. General comments regarding aerial incident cases 
 
a) Aerial incident cases before the International Court of Justice 
 
The so-named aerial incident cases before the ICJ may be characterised in the following way:  
 
Where a state uses lethal or non-lethal force against an aircraft—usually, but 
not exclusively, against a military aircraft—that is registered in another 
state.  
 
Specifically, several aerial incident cases were brought before the ICJ at the height of the Cold 
War in the 1950s.5 From a Hungarian perspective it is of historical interest that Hungary was a 
respondent together with the Soviet Union in respect of the seizure of a U.S. state aircraft and 
the treatment of its crew in Hungary. In that particular case, the treatment of the U.S. personnel 
by the local authorities—with respect to the court proceedings instituted against the U.S. 
servicemen—was the main thrust of the complaints and proceedings instituted by the United 
States.6  
The aerial incident cases are not only limited to issues related to the use of force, but have given 
rise to other type of disputes, such as the division of competences between the ICJ and the UN 
Security Council (see Lockerbie case).7 The present paper shall exclusively deal with the former 
category of aerial incident cases where force was used against a civil aircraft by a state. It is 
noteworthy that cases before the ICJ concerned with legal disputes other than aerial incidents 
may occasionally have some relevance to the subject matter of this paper. However, the use of 
                                                          
4 http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/ 
5 For example: Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954 (United States of America v. Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics), Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953 (United States of America v. Czechoslovakia). By way of example 
of a post-Cold War aerial incident: Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India).   
6 Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America (United States of America v. Hungarian 
People's Republic). For details, see: Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and 
International Law, 47 Am. J. Int’l L. 559, 1953, pp. 581-585. 
7 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) 1992 and Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 1992. 
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force against civil aircraft never played a preponderant role in the cases mentioned thus far and 
similarly to the aerial incident cases no judgement has been given by the ICJ with respect to 
specific allegations.8  
 
The facts related to such aerial incidents, and in particular the circumstances regarding the use 
of force, are typically a point of disagreement among concerned parties. The injured Party 
usually brings the case before the International Court of Justice to seek inter alia a legally 
binding decision declaring a breach of one or more international obligations and to request the 
award of corresponding reparations for injury caused. As a result of such, states go beyond 
mere political declarations and submit legal arguments during the proceedings before ICJ. 
However, such legal issues do not exist in a vacuum, in that they cannot be disentangled from 
the factual and political context in which they arise. Such is the case for the state submissions 
presented to ICJ.  
 
The International Court of Justice was debarred from ruling on the aerial incident cases as a 
result of two principal factors: it either lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate on such disputes or the 
Parties ultimately requested a case be removed from the court’s list. In the absence of a ruling 
on a case, the International Court’s efforts were confined to addressing jurisdictional issues, 
especially in interpreting Article 36 of the Statute of the Court.  
 
b)  Aerial incidents - the wider international context 
 
Many of such incidents may not only lead to loss of life but also create conditions for inter-
state disputes between the state using armed force and the state in which the attacked aircraft is 
registered—in addition to the involvement of state of nationality of the victim(s) through the 
exercise of diplomatic protection.  
 
The loss of human life and its effect on relations between states is therefore a matter of general 
international concern.9 In response to such incidents the experience has been that different 
organs of the United Nations become involved in such matter, either individually or 
simultaneously; these including the Security Council, the General Assembly, ICAO Council, 
ICAO Assembly10, and the International Court of Justice. The power relations between states 
involved in an aerial incident has a decisive influence on the outcome of proceedings. The 
                                                          
8 The Democratic Republic of Congo claimed that Uganda (and/or Burundi and/or Rwanda) shot down (on 9 
October 1998 at Kindu) a Boeing 727 that was the property of Congo Airlines, thereby causing the death of 40 
civilians. See: International Court of Justice Application Instituting proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court 
on 23 June 1999 Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) p. 17. 
The ICJ did not examine the allegations made by DRC. The particular incident was not invoked by DRC during 
the proceedings. The reason may lie in the fact that no factual evidence was available to corroborate allegations. 
The Court found in its judgment that it had no convincing evidence as to the town of Kindu having been taken by 
Ugandan forces in October 1998. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168 at p. 208, para. 83. In 2001 the DRC v. Burundi and 
DRC v. Rwanda cases were discontinued at the request of DRC. In 2002 the DRC reinstituted proceedings against 
Rwanda and submitted the same allegations pertaining to the shooting down of a civil Congolese aircraft at Kindu 
on the 9th of October 1998. The DRC qualified the acts violations of inter alia the UN Charter, Chicago Convention 
and Montreal Convention. In 2006 the ICJ ruled that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by 
DRC in 2002. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application : 2002) (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6. 
9 927 (1955) UNGA Resolution entitled question of the safety of commercial aircraft flying in the vicinity of, or 
inadvertently crossing, international frontiers. This resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly in the 
wake of the 1955 Bulgarian aerial incident case. 
10 International Civil Aviation Organization (see article 43 of the Chicago Convention), a U.N. specialized agency. 
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Security Council, for example, has condemned the destruction of civil aircraft only on very rare 
occasions.11  
 
 
4. Two aerial incident cases that are the subject of an in-depth study 
 
a) General remarks 
 
Of the two cases under examination, the first case study is that of an aerial incident occurring 
on 27 July 1955. This was a case whose principal focus concerned the interpretation of 
customary international law pertaining to the use of force by a state against a civil aircraft 
inadvertently straying into its airspace. In the second case study, an aerial incident occurring on 
3 July 1988, the key issue was the interpretation of conventional and customary international 
law pertaining to the use of force by a state purporting to exercise self-defence against a civil 
aircraft during an international armed conflict. 
 
 
b) Aerial incident occurring on 27 July 1955  
 
Factual background: On 27 July 1955 a civil aircraft on a scheduled flight from Vienna 
to Lod (Lydda) belonging to EL AL Israel Airlines was shot down over Bulgaria by units of the 
Bulgarian Security Forces. Fifty-one passengers of various nationalities and seven crew 
members were killed.12 It was submitted that, contrary to Bulgarian statements, no prior 
warning was given to the Israeli plane prior to the use of armed force against it. Furthermore, 
the aircraft was not permitted to leave Bulgarian airspace and was prevented from making an 
emergency landing.13 
After fruitless protracted diplomatic negotiations between Israel and Bulgaria, Israel initiated 
proceedings, in 1957, against the government of Bulgaria before the ICJ. In addition, exercising 
diplomatic protection with respect to their nationals, the U.S. and U.K. presented claims before 
the same court on behalf of (relatives of) deceased passengers. The three applicant states argued 
that the jurisdiction of ICJ was substantiated by Bulgaria’s acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) made on 29 July, 1921. The 
World Court, however, eventually accepted Bulgaria’s preliminary objection and ruled that 
since Bulgaria was not a founding signatory to the UN Charter (and ICJ Statute), the rules 
foreseeing the continuity of the declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ 
were not applicable to Bulgaria.14 The cases were discontinued at the request of the applicants.  
                                                          
11 One of the few exceptions, or probably the only exception, when destruction of civil aircraft was condemned by 
UNSC is the shooting down of two civil aircraft registered in the U.S. on 24 February 1996 by Cuba. See 
S/RES/1067 (1996) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1067(1996) (14 
February 2016). With respect to the destruction of the Iran Air Flight the Security Council did not condemn the 
U.S., but solely expressed “deep distress” and “profound regret” at the occurrence of the incident. UNSC 
Resolution 616 (1988) of 20 July 1988. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_616.pdf (22 January 2016). The Soviet Union another Permanent 
Member of the UN Security Council was never condemned by the Security Council for shooting down an aircraft 
(e.g. in respect of the KAL-007 tragedy).  
12Application instituting proceedings on behalf of the Government of Israel 16 October 1957. Aerial incident of 
27 July 1955. p. 5. I.C.J. Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Document. 
13 See for example Memorial submitted by the Government of the United States of America of 2 December 1958,  
pp. 177-183, para. 207, pp. 204 and 239. Memorial of the Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-
PLEADINGS), pp. 94-95, paras. 80-83. 
14 Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria) Preliminary Objections, Judgement 
of May 26th, 1959: I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 127. Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (United States 
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Written legal arguments submitted by the states concerned: The applicant states submitted that 
opening fire in times of peace to destroy a clearly marked unarmed civil aircraft that 
inadvertently (e.g. owing to distress or necessity) strays into foreign airspace without prior 
authorization is a violation of international law.15 Elementary humanitarian obligations were 
repeatedly invoked to condemn the Bulgarian act, including reference to the judgment of the 
ICJ in the Corfu Channel case.16 Moreover, the duty to provide assistance to persons in distress, 
based on analogies with maritime law and Article 25 of the Chicago Convention, was invoked.17 
The United Kingdom submitted that armed force against a foreign ship or aircraft was not 
justified under international law, unless it was used in the legitimate exercise of the right of self-
defence. This principle is reflected in Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
states that there is a general prohibition on the use of force in relations among states. 
Furthermore, the U.K.—relying on the Corfu Channel case (I.C.J. reports 1949)—emphasized 
that international law condemns actions by states in peace time that unnecessarily or recklessly 
involves endangering the lives of nationals of other states or the destruction of their property.18 
Moreover, the U.K. alluded to other case law, thereby suggesting that the use of force against 
civil aircraft was not exclusively concerned with the prohibition of the use of force in inter-state 
relations, but rather had another dimension: namely, the duty of a state to protect individuals. 
The Garcia case (1926) is relevant in this regard, in which the Mexican/U.S. Claims 
Commission held that the use of lethal force by a U.S. border guard against Mexican nationals 
crossing the border illegally constituted a violation of international law.19 Furthermore, the U.K. 
submitted that as Article 9 c) of the Chicago Convention does not sanction the use of force 
against aircraft flying above prohibited or restricted areas, no contracting party should be in a 
stronger position in respect of using force against a civil aircraft overflying parts of a state’s 
territory other than prohibited or restricted areas.20 
It is noteworthy that the United States and Israel made some hints in their submissions that 
could be interpreted in such a way that the use of force may be justified under certain 
circumstances that fall outside the stricto sensu right of legitimate self-defence. The U.S. 
stressed that under international law in extreme cases security and special security 
                                                          
of America v. Bulgaria), Order of 30 May 1960: I.C.J. Reports 1960. p. 146. Case concerning the Aerial Incident 
of 27July 1955 (United Kingdom v. Bulgaria) Order of 3 August 1959: I.C.J. Reports 19-59, p. 264. 
15 Memorial of the Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-PLEADINGS), p. 85,  para. 63,  p. 87. 
para. 66. 
Memorial submitted by the Government of the United States of America of 2 December 1958, pp. 237, 240-241, 
para. 6. 
Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 August 
1958,  p. 354, para. 55,  p. 356,  para. 59, p. 358, para. 66,  pp. 365-366, para. 81.  
16 Memorial of Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-PLEADINGS), p. 53, para. 15, p. 71, para. 42, 
p. 84, para. 61. 
 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 
August 1958, p.58, paras. 67-68.  
Memorial submitted by the Government of the United States of America of 2 December 1958. para I. p. 240. 
17 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United States of America of 2 December 1958, pp. 222- 227.  
and Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 
August 1958, pp. 358-361, paras. 68-72.  
18 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 
August 1958, p. 358, para. 66.  
19 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 
August 1958, p. 362, para. 76. For details concerning the Garcia case (1926-9, see: Reports of International Awards 
– Recueil des sentences arbitrales Teodoro García and M. A. Garza (United Mexican States) v. United States of 
America 3 December 1926 Volume IV pp. 119-134. http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_IV/119-134.pdf (8 
February 2015). 
20 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 
August 1958, para.78, pp. 363-364.  
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considerations may leave no alternative to the destruction of an airplane.21 While taking note 
of the legitimate interests of a state to protect its national sovereignty, Israel for its part 
emphasized that the degree of violence used by Bulgaria was out of proportion to, and in excess 
of, any possible threat the civil aircraft could have possibly presented to Bulgaria.22 
The United States described an example of a set of circumstances leaving no option to a state 
but the destruction of an aircraft: the case of an unauthorized, unforewarned flight of a military 
aircraft at great speed that refuses to listen to or comply with reasonable orders from air traffic 
control; or, an airborne fighter that fails to identify itself, bearing no clear markings, which 
proves by its character and conduct in other ways to possess, by all objective evidence, a clearly 
hostile intent, directing its flight without deviation toward a high security area.23 
Israel and the United States submitted that, according to the practice of civilised nations 
(customary international law) at the time of the incident, a state confronted with the a scenario 
of a non-intentional breach of airspace sovereignty—such as one made by a clearly identifiable 
civil aircraft—has two options at its disposal, namely: a) through diplomatic channels, take the 
matter up with the registered Government of the State of the aircraft; or, b) in the case of a 
security violation, require the aircraft to land at an appropriate facility.24 Given that Bulgaria 
was not a State Party to the Chicago Convention on international civil aviation, Israel relied 
upon the Chicago Convention only to the extent that it restated customary international law.  
 
Initially in the direct aftermath of the tragedy, Bulgaria recognised its responsibility and 
promised to punish the perpetrators as well as offer compensation to the relatives. In this regard 
Bulgaria acknowledged that its armed forces acted with certain “haste” and did not take all 
necessary measures to force the aircraft to land.25 However, in 1957 the Bulgarian government 
reversed its earlier position and offered to make only ex gratia payment to relatives of the 
victims as a gesture of good-will. Bulgaria thus relied on a humanitarian approach (as opposed 
to recognising legal responsibility) and also made reference to certain treaties to calculate the 
amount of compensation—namely, to the Warsaw Convention on the unification of certain 
rules relating to liability of air carriers.26 Bulgaria justified its offer for compensation by 
reference to the before mentioned convention regulating the liability of the air carrier towards 
passengers. Both Israel and the United Kingdom rejected this interpretation.27 Sofia was of the 
view that the dispute fell within the internal competences of Bulgaria; moreover, available 
domestic remedies had not been exhausted by the families of the victims.28 Sofia argued that 
the principles of international law were not applicable to the case and that the shooting down 
of the airplane was in accordance with the law; as a result of which, Bulgarian responsibility 
was not involved.29 Notwithstanding the fact that domestic regulations were in place permitting 
the bringing down of intruding foreign aircraft not responding to warning shots, Bulgaria did 
                                                          
21 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United States of America of 2 December 1958, p. 239, subparas. 
(v) - (vi), p. 24, para. 3. 
22 Memorial of the Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-PLEADINGS), pp. 84-86, paras. 60-65.  
23 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United States of America of 2 December, 1958, p. 239. 
24 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United States of America of 2 December 1958, pp. 210-211, 235-
236. and Memorial of the Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-PLEADINGS), pp. 86-87, para. 66. 
25 Memorial of Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-PLEADINGS), pp. 56-60, paras. 24-28.  
26 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 
August 1958, p. 357, para. 63.  
Memorial of Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-PLEADINGS), p. 81, para. 54. 
27 Memorial of Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-PLEADINGS), para 100.p. 105.and Memorial 
submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 August 1958, p. 
357, para. 63.  
28 Exceptions préliminaires du Gouvernement de la République Populaire de Bulgarie (Israel c. Bulgarie) 
déclinatoire de compétence, le 4 décembre 1958, p. 132. 
29 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 
August 1958 para 61-62 p. 356 and Israel Memorial of 2 June 1958, p. 79, para. 51.  
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not rely on the decree as justification for its acts.30 Rather, Bulgaria put the blame on the airline 
company that allegedly caused the tragedy in the first place—by intruding and penetrating into 
Bulgaria’s airspace without permission (“sans preavis”).31  
 
Interim conclusions: The aerial incident in question brought to light a broad range of reactions 
by the states involved. On the one hand, the applicant states were of the view that the dispute 
was of an international character, concerned with the violation of international law. From the 
Bulgarian perspective, on the other hand, the use of force against a civil aircraft flying in its 
national airspace was a purely domestic matter. The three states asserted that during peace time 
the non-intentional breach of sovereignty of a state by a clearly marked civil aircraft (e.g. owing 
to being in distress and acting without prior authorisation) carrying the registration mark of 
another state did not justify use of armed force against the straying aircraft. Elementary 
considerations of humanity were invoked inter alia in reference to the judgement of the ICJ in 
the Corfu Channel case. According to the interpretation by the three states of international 
customary law at the time of the events, the use of force against civil aircraft was prohibited 
quasi-universally, subject only to the right of self-defence by states under the United Nations 
Charter and other narrowly defined exceptions. As regards the other possible causes for 
exoneration from responsibility, the U.S. referred to special security considerations, whereas 
Israel invoked the principle of proportionality. The U.S provided a hypothetical example of 
permitted use of force to destroy an aircraft. The circumstances described to that effect referred 
to a military aircraft demonstrating a hostile intent. The U.K. was the most categorical among 
the three states in rejecting the use of force and in strictly limiting exceptions thereof to self-
defence under the UN Charter.32 The three states had to rely on international customary law in 
their submissions due to the fact that Bulgaria was not a state party to the Chicago Convention 
on international civil aviation at the time of the occurrence of the aerial incident. Apparently, 
despite the non-state character of the civil aircraft involved in the event, the states concerned 
considered the case an inter-state affair. This conclusion is supported by the following 
elements: the applicant states espoused the claims of their citizens; Israel apologised for the 
violation of Bulgarian airspace, although the aircraft was not a state organ of Israel;33 U.K. 
referred to Article 2 (4) of the Charter. Having said that, in the U.K. memorial reference was 
also made to the Garcia case (1926), which adds another dimension to the consideration of the 
subject matter—namely, the rights of individuals travelling on civil aircraft to be protected by 
states under international human rights law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Aerial incident occurring on 3 July 1988   
 
 
Factual background: On 3 July 1988 Iran Air flight  655—a scheduled flight between Bandar 
Abbas and Dubai—was destroyed over Iranian territorial airspace by surface-to-air missiles 
                                                          
30 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United States of America of 2 December 1958, pp. 237-240. 
31 Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 28 
August 1958, p. 347, para. 41, p. 348, para. 43. 
32 Hughes, op.cit., pp. 608, 615-617. 
33 Memorial of the Government of Israel of 2 June 1958 (SECTION B.-PLEADINGS), pp. 87-88, para. 67. 
9 
 
launched from USS Vincennes, a United States warship, killing 290 passengers and its crew.34 
This aerial incident occurred in the midst of an armed engagement between Iran and the U.S.35 
The case was brought before the ICAO Council by Iran and subsequently on 17 May 1989 Iran 
initiated proceedings against the U.S. before the ICJ. The United States submitted preliminary 
objections to the application. In 1996 the case was discontinued upon joint notification of the 
agent of the parties notifying the International Court that the two governments had entered into 
a full and final settlement of disputes, differences, claims, counterclaims and matters directly 
or indirectly related to the case.36 
Initially, in sharp contrast to its previous position concerning the destruction of South Korean 
civil flight KAL-007 by the Soviet Union, the U.S. saw no binding obligation to compensate 
Iran for the death of its citizens and loss of the plane.37 Ultimately, the U.S. paid compensation 
to the families of the victims of the tragedy on an ex gratia basis, but refused to pay damages 
for the airplane.38 This policy was in line with the U.S. interpretation of the principles governing 
liability for damage arising from military operations, which includes the option of ex gratia 
payment without acknowledging, and irrespective of, legal liability.39 
The following description of the case and positions is based on the memorial on 24 July 1990 
submitted by Iran and the preliminary objections on 4 March 1991 submitted by the U.S. The 
Iranian observations from 9 September 1992—made in response to the preliminary objections 
of the U.S.—are not discussed due to length constraints.  
 
Written legal arguments submitted by the concerned states: Iran claimed in its application and 
memorial inter alia that the US had violated Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, the customary rules 
of international law prohibiting the use of force, the sovereignty of Iran, the principle of non-
intervention, the Chicago Convention, the Montreal Convention, the rules of neutrality in armed 
conflict, the law of the sea, and the bilateral treaty of amity signed between Iran and U.S. 
Furthermore, the ICAO Council resolution of 17 March 1989 was erroneous and that the U.S. 
had committed an international crime.40 Iran, in a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General, 
qualified the incident as a premeditated act of aggression by the United States which violated, 
in particular, Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention on airspace sovereignty.41 Iran 
qualified the act of the U.S. as an armed attack against Iranian territorial sovereignty.42 With 
reference to the practice of the ICAO Council pertaining to past cases of acts of shooting down 
aircraft, Iran was seeking condemnation of the U.S. by the Council that, however, never 
                                                          
34 ICJ Application instituting proceedings, filed in the Registry of the Court on 17 May 1989 Aerial Incident of 3 
July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) p. 4. and Memorial submitted by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran; Case concerning the aerial incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of 
America) Volume I., 24 July 1990, p. 1. 
35 Preliminary objections submitted by the United States of America; Case concerning the aerial incident of 3 July 
1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Volume II., 4 March 1991, p. [9]. 
36 Aerial incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order of 22 February 
1996, I.C.J. reports 1996, p.9. 
37 Kay Hailbronner, Daniel Heilmann, Aerial cases before International Courts and Tribunals Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, March (2009), para. 17. 
38 Kay Hailbronner, Daniel Heilmann, Aerial cases before International Courts and Tribunals, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, March (2009), para. 20. 
39 Brian E. Foont, Shooting down civilian aircraft: is there an international law? Journal of air law and commerce, 
Volume 72, Fall (2007) Number 4, p. 172. 
40 Memorial submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Case concerning the aerial incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) Volume I. 24 July 1990, pp. 2-3, 99-100, 237-238, 244, 258, 273 
and 292. 
41 Ibid., p. 187. 
42 Ibid., pp. 136, 291-294. 
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materialized. Iran rejected this perceived double standard.43 Iran maintained that the U.S. 
breached Articles 1, 2, 3bis, 44 a), 44 h) and Annex 2, Annex 11 and Annex 15 of the Chicago 
Convention.44 The destruction of an aircraft was a threat to general security in Iran’s view.45 
Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention on the prohibition of weapons against civil aircraft in 
flight reflected a norm of customary international law.46 A connection was made between 
Article 3 bis and the general ius cogens rule on the prohibition of the use of force enshrined in 
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.47 Iran alluded to the ICJ judgement in the Corfu Channel case, 
the U.K. memorial in the Bulgarian aerial incident of 1955 discussed earlier in this paper and 
to the Garcia v. United States arbitration case (1926) to substantiate that the U.S. recklessly 
risked the lives of innocent persons, as well as put civil aviation in danger.48 
 
In Iran’s assessment the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, including the intrusion of 
U.S. warships into Iranian territorial waters, was a contributing factor to the shooting down of 
the civil aircraft and to the endangerment of civil aviation.49 The U.S. failed to use proper means 
of civil-military co-operation.50 The military of a third state do not enjoy any rights in respect 
of a Flight Information Region (FIR) where civil air traffic services are provided by an authority 
designated by the state of the FIR.51 Iran submitted that the NOTAMs52 creating a “floating 
defence identification zone” around the U.S. warships issued by the U.S. with respect to the 
Persian Gulf prior to the aerial incident were unlawful and ultra vires. The said NOTAMs 
violated ICAO standards and practices. Only a designated civil ATS authority had a mandate 
to issue such NOTAMs in respect to their FIR.53  
Iran argued that not only natural persons but also governments or armed forces may commit 
offences against civil aviation prohibited by the Montreal Convention; for example, in the 
context of state terrorism.54 As a justification for rejection of the plea of self-defence by the 
U.S., Iran submitted that a civil aircraft is incapable of mounting an armed attack. If the U.S. 
actions were indeed in response to an armed attack, which was not the case, even then the 
military response by the U.S. neither met the requirements of necessity nor that of 
proportionality.55 Iran submitted that the U.S. violated the international customary and 
conventional rules on neutrality, including the 1907 Hague Convention—by aiding Iraq in the 
Iran-Iraq conflict, which eventually led to the treatment of the Iran Air flight as a hostile aircraft 
and its destruction.56 Iran rebutted the accidental argument and submitted that the 
                                                          
43 Ibid., pp. 106, 110, 259, 261-262 and 292. Resolution of ICAO Council dated 17 March 1989 deplored the tragic 
incident which occurred as a consequence of events and errors in identification of the aircraft which resulted in 
the accidental destruction of the airliner and loss of 290 lives [emphasis added]. See full text of ICAO resolution 
reproduced on p. 106 of the Memorial submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
44 Memorial submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran case concerning the aerial incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) of 24 July 1990 Volume I 24 July 1990, p. 141. 
45 Ibid., p. 143. 
46 Ibid., pp. 147-152, 154. 
47 Ibid., pp. 185-187. 
48 Ibid., pp. 188-190, 216, 236-237, 258 and 265-266. 
49 Ibid., pp. 209-216, 259, 293. 
50 Ibid., p. 238. 
51 Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
52 Definition of NOTAM in Annex 15 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation Aeronautical 
Information Services Fourteenth Edition July 2013 p. 1-6: “A notice distributed by means of telecommunication 
containing information concerning the establishment, condition or change in any aeronautical facility, service, 
procedure or hazard, the timely knowledge of which is essential to personnel concerned with flight operations.” 
53 Memorial submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Case concerning the aerial incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) of 24 July 1990 Volume I 24 July 1990, pp. 170-171, 210, 217-227. 
54 Ibid., pp. 174-177, 246, 256-257. 
55 Ibid., pp. 200-205, 247-251. 
56 Ibid., pp. 206, 208, 211, 230-235. 
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misidentification of the aircraft was not a credible argument in light of the highly advanced 
technical capabilities of the USS Vincennes.57 Iran recalled that in previous aerial incidents the 
U.S. had strongly condemned use of armed force against aircraft.58 The Iranian Government 
demanded punitive or exemplary damages because of the “criminal nature of the act”.59 Iran 
made some critical remarks to the ICAO Report instituted to investigate the circumstances of 
the incident.60 
 
The United States argued that the destruction of the aircraft cannot be separated from the events 
that preceded it. A hostile environment existed due to Iran’s actions, including Iranian attacks 
on U.S. naval vessels that were deployed to assist merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf. The 
USS Vincennes was forced to act in self-defence as a result of attacks by Iranian gunboats. In 
the midst of these skirmishes an approaching aircraft that failed to respond to repeated warnings 
was perceived as being a military aircraft with hostile intentions. The USS Vincennes fired on 
the aircraft as a matter of necessity. The United States immediately expressed its deep regret 
and promised to compensate the families.61 According to the investigation into the incident 
initiated by U.S. Iran shared responsibility for the tragedy by endangering one of its civil 
airliners by allowing it to fly on a relatively low altitude air route in close proximity to ongoing 
hostilities. The outcome of the investigation, which largely formed the basis of the ICAO report, 
concluded that the downing of Iran Air 655 was neither the result of any negligent nor any 
culpable conduct by any U.S. navy personnel associated with the incident.62 The U.S. strongly 
rejected the assertion that the U.S. had committed an international crime and reminded the ICJ 
that it was not established as a criminal court.63 
The United States explained at length that Iran’s claims had no connection with the Montreal 
Convention and stated that the Convention did not apply to acts of states against civil aircraft—
particularly acts committed by armed forces of states. Their counter assertion was that the 
Montreal Convention, the well-established laws of armed conflict that contain the inherent right 
of self-defence (Article 51 of UN Charter)—encompassing the right of military units to defend 
themselves from attack—applied to actions of the United States.64 The U.S. consistently applied 
the law of armed conflict, including the 1949 Conventions, to all of its hostile encounters with 
Iranian forces during the relevant period preceding the destruction of the aircraft.65 The actions 
in question were attributable to the U.S. and not to persons as contemplated by the Montreal 
Convention. This was not a situation where individual terrorists might have been covertly 
directed or assisted by a state.66 The U.S. asserted that the Montreal Convention does not serve 
as a basis for condemnation by the ICAO Council of the use of armed force against a civil 
aircraft by a military aircraft in the course of an armed conflict. In the assessment of the U.S, 
the Iranians at no time considered the incident in the light of the Montreal Convention until it 
was decided to approach the ICJ and began searching for a legal basis that would permit it to 
do so.67 
 
                                                          
57 Ibid., pp. 240-244. 
58 Ibid., pp. 252-255. 
59 Ibid., pp. 275, 283-284, 294. 
60 Ibid., Appendix. 
61 Preliminary objections submitted by the United States of America, Case concerning the aerial incident of 3 July 
1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Volume II., 4 March 1991, pp.[10], [11], [42], [227-
228]. 
62 Ibid., pp. [53] [54] [55]. 
63 Ibid., p. [86]. 
64 Ibid., pp. [4], [147], [165-200]. 
65 Ibid., pp. [202-204]. 
66 Ibid., pp. [172], [209]-[210]. 
67 Ibid., p. [163]. 
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The U.S., on the one hand, suggested in a footnote that the Chicago Convention did not apply 
to the present case due to it not being concerned with the conduct of surface vessels engaged in 
active combat. In this regard reference was made to Articles 3 and 89 of the Chicago 
Convention.68 On the other hand, the U.S. stressed the fact that Article 3 bis of the Chicago 
Convention—referring to the UN Charter (self-defence)—is an exception to the general 
prohibition on the use of weapons against civil aircraft, as it is a testament to the drafters’ 
intention to address (through Article 3 bis) actions by military forces in armed conflict.69 
The U.S. expressed displeasure at the fact that the Government of Iran did not approach the 
United States directly, but instead sought political condemnation of U.S. by the Security 
Council of United Nations and the ICAO.70 The U.S. submitted that in the case of contracting 
parties having a disagreement over the application of the Chicago Convention they can either 
submit the dispute to quasi-judicial proceedings under article 84 of the Convention or request 
the ICAO Council to act and discuss the matter from a policy and technical point of view under 
Article 54-55 to the Convention. These two options are mutually exclusive. The ICJ has no 
jurisdiction to review the policy and technical decisions of the ICAO Council. The international 
court may only review those decisions of the ICAO Council that were taken in the application 
of Article 84 of the Chicago Convention.71 
The U.S. recalled that in accordance with ICAO rules it had asked the competent States of the 
Persian Gulf to issue the U.S. NOTAMs containing defensive precautions. Iran, however, 
rejected the NOTAM and ruled it illegal. Iran refused to comply with its responsibility to warn 
civil aviation of potential dangers. Iran failed to co-operate with military authorities responsible 
for activities that could affect civil aviation in the Gulf region. In light of the foregoing the U.S. 
had no other choice but to publish the NOTAM by itself. Finally, on 1 March 1989, the U.S. 
withdrew the NOTAM it had issued for the Gulf and again asked regional states to issue the 
NOTAM as their own document. Nearly all concerned states complied with the U.S. request.72 
The U.S. underlined that the ICAO Air Navigation Commission—having examined the ICAO 
report on the incidence, which was largely based on the U.S. investigation—found that no 
significant amendments were needed to the relevant ICAO Standards and Practices.73 
 
Interim conclusions: The incident under review was the first before the ICJ that occurred after 
the adoption, albeit prior to entry into force, of the special norm of conventional international 
law banning the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight. It is telling to note that the U.S. 
invoked self-defence, which is the sole exception to general prohibition on the use of weapons 
permitted under Article 3 bis.74 The U.S. emphasized international state responsibility over any 
possible individual criminal liability of U.S. servicemen under the Montreal Convention. The 
United States deemed that the special legal regime relating to an international armed conflict 
was applicable to the incident under discussion. It may have been that the intention was to 
suggest that different rules, including a different threshold, applied in times of war than in times 
of peace in respect of the use of force against civil aircraft. It is reassuring to note, however, 
that apparently the U.S. has neither questioned the customary legal status of Article 3 bis nor 
its applicability during an armed conflict. Furthermore, Iran acknowledged that Article 3 bis 
was a rule of customary international law. The presumption being that Iran only made a 
connection between Article 3 bis and Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter as a result of the aircraft 
                                                          
68 Ibid., p. [91]. 
69 Ibid., compare footnote on p. [91] to p. [205]. 
70 Ibid., pp. [42], [56]-[60]. 
71 Ibid., pp. [108], [132]-[137]. 
72 Ibid., Annex 2., pp. [1]-[7]. 
73 Ibid., Annex 2., p. [67]. 
74 Lutz Horn, Die Anwendung militärischer Gewalt auf zivile Passagierflugzeuge im Friedensvölkerrecht und ihre 
Rechtsfolgen, Europäische Hochschulschriften - Reihe II, Broschiert, 1992, pp. 183, 221. 
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being shot down in its national airspace. Besides the self-defence argument, the error or mistake 
in identifying the aircraft played a preponderant role in the legal arguments, substantiating 
exoneration from responsibility put forward by the U.S. In the present author’s view invoking 
error or mistake as a ground for exoneration from international responsibility should not be 
accepted or limited to such exceptional cases—otherwise innocent passengers and crew will 
bear the brunt of such acts or omissions committed by a third state, which cannot remotely be 
considered acceptable or justifiable.75 Taking all factors into consideration, the modalities of 
civil-military co-operation in civil aviation during international and non-international armed 
conflict remains a topical and timely issue as of today. The issue is all the more challenging 
where non-state actors are involved in the armed conflict, as non-state actors do not 
automatically assume obligations arising from international law, including obligations 
stipulated under the Chicago Convention in respect of the territories that they control.  The 
tragedy of Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 in the airspace over the Ukraine in 2014 
demonstrated once again that appropriate civil-military co-operation in civil aviation during an 
armed conflict is a prerequisite for safeguarding the safety of civil aviation.  
 
 
5. Overall conclusions 
 
 
No judgement on the merits of any aerial incident case was ever delivered by the ICJ due to the 
World Court’s lack of jurisdiction. No state involved in such an incident brought before the 
World Court ever acknowledged international responsibility for its acts and/or omissions.76 
Instead compensation was offered and paid solely out of humanitarian considerations, on an ex 
gratia basis. Nonetheless, the written submissions of the parties to such cases do provide 
valuable information on the concerned states’ interpretation of international law pertaining to 
the use of force against civil aircraft. The applicant states in the first aerial incident case 
discussed in this paper submitted that a rule of customary international law existed prohibiting 
the use of force against civil aircraft, subject solely to narrow exceptions. The three concerned 
states had a somewhat different interpretation as to the actual scope of the exceptions. Bulgaria 
denied that the shooting down of a foreign aircraft was an international matter subject to rules 
of international law. 
 
The fact that the first aerial incident was no more than a mere violation of national airspace, 
where neither an overflight over a prohibited zone nor espionnage activities—nor any other 
direct threat to the national security of Bulgaria—were involved, may have contributed to the 
categorical condemnation under international law of the acts of Bulgaria by the three applicant 
states. At any rate, at the time of their submissions the arguments of the three applicant states 
were of a rather progressive character. Sadly, however, the interpretation of international law 
did not necessarily reflect the actual state practice of the 1950s or that of the ensuing decades. 
For example, the UN General Assembly Resolution adopted in the wake of the Bulgarian aerial 
incident addressed the destruction of the aircraft solely from a humanitarian perspective, 
without going into issues pertaining to responsibility, condemnation of the perpetrator, nor other 
elements relevant from the perspective of international law.77 In actual fact, for certain states, 
                                                          
75 For a comprehensive study, with a focus on mistake analysis of the aerial incident, see David K. Linnan: Iran 
Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken self-defence, and State Responsibility, 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 245 
(1991). 
76 It is to note that China acknowledged her responsibility for mistakenly shooting down the Cathay Pacific flight 
in 1954. See Hughes, op. cit., pp. 601-602. 
77 Kay Hailbronner, Der Schutz der Luftgrenzen im Frieden, C. Heymann, 1972, p. 35. and Lutz, op.cit., pp. 169-
172. 
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the protection of sovereignty over airspace and the fear associated with the misuse of civil 
aviation prevailed over humanitarian considerations (e.g. KAL-007 tragedy). The taking of 
human life was not considered a disproportionate measure compared to ensuring the protection 
of real or perceived threats to national security that fell well short of an armed attack.78 It is also 
relevant that some decades later two of the applicant states in the first aerial incident also used 
force against civil aircraft, albeit under different circumstances (Israel in 1973, the U.S. in 
1988). Nonetheless the thrust of the arguments put forward by the three applicant states, 
particularly the categorical rejection of the use of force by U.K., were eventually reflected in 
Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention prohibiting the use of armed force against a civil 
aircraft (1984) adopted in the aftermath of the KAL-007 tragedy of 1983.79  
 
It is noteworthy that in the second aerial incident case discussed in this paper, the U.S. relied 
on self-defence under the UN Charter— this being the only permitted exception to the general 
prohibition against the use of force under Article 3 bis. One possible reading regarding the fact 
that the U.S. invoked the rules concerning the law of armed conflict is that the special legal 
regime may contain a different level of protection for civil aircraft against use of force than the 
corresponding rules applicable in times of peace. In its submissions in the stated aerial incident 
case, the U.S.—which has yet to ratify80 Article 3 bis—has neither questioned the customary 
legal status of Article 3 bis, nor its applicability during an armed conflict. This exception of 
self-defence, enshrined in the UN Charter,81 may be subject to different interpretations with 
regards to the requirements that must be fulfilled for an attack to qualify as an armed attack 
(minimum level of gravity, minimum threshold of state involvement, timeline etc.). As we have 
seen in the second aerial incident case the U.S. considers the right of individual military units 
to defend themselves from an attack as a legitimate exercise of self-defence under the UN 
Charter. This is a vast and complex subject that has a direct bearing on the purview of protection 
of civil aircraft afforded by international law. Trying, however, to address it in detail would go 
beyond the scope of the present paper.  
 
The above mentioned Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention declares customary international 
law.82 In academic literature views diverge, however, as to whether the codification was 
actually more restrictive or broader in scope than the actual customary state practice that was 
codified.83 Be that as it may, the significance of the codification was that general threats to the 
                                                          
78 For a comprehensive review of the proportionality principle see Lutz, op.cit., pp. 92-102. 
79 Lutz, op.cit., p. 179. 
80 For status of ratification of Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention see: 
http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/3bis_EN.pdf (09 February 2016) Iran deposited its 
instrument of ratification on the 17th of June 1994 so the said amendment to the Chicago Convention was not in 
force in respect of Iran at the time of the aerial incident. To date the U.S has not ratified Article 3 bis of the Chicago 
Convention. 
81 The most relevant provision of Article 3 bis is as follows [emphasis added] (a) The contracting States recognize 
that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in cases 
where there is an interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This 
provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
82 Michael Milde, Interception of Civil Aircraft vs. Misuse of Civil Aviation (Background of Amendment 27 to 
Annex 2), Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. XI. (1986), pp. 125-126. 
83 A. Majid, Treaty amendment inspired by the Korean Plane Tragedy: Custom clarified or confused? German 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol 29 (1986) pp. 206, 223. Majid argues that (at the time of codification in 1984) 
customary rule of international law forbidding use of force against civil aircraft had a wider scope than Article 3 
bis of the Chicago Convention. For an opposite interpretation see John V. Augustin, ICAO and the use of force 
against civil aerial intruders Thesis Institute of Air and Space Law Faculty of Law McGill University, 1998, p. 
213. Augustin is of the opinion that Article 3 bis did not coincide with international law before 10 May 1984 in 
the sense that it seems to lay down an obligation to refrain from using weapons in circumstances where the pre-
existing law would allow it. 
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security of a state (e.g violation of airspace) and/or criminal use of aviation (e.g. drug 
smuggling) could no longer justify the use of force against a civil aircraft.84 The outcome of the 
codification was by no means a foregone conclusion in 1984, as at the 25th Extraordinary 
Session of the ICAO Assembly (devoted to drafting Article 3 bis) the former socialist states 
made a last-ditch effort to create a ground for exculpation for shooting down a civil aircraft—
such as when the state of registry of an aircraft does not prevent an intrusion, or any other use 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Chicago Convention.85 Calls for an appropriate balance 
between principles of non-use of force against civil aircraft and non-use of such aircraft for 
inappropriate purposes (and inviolability of sovereignty) have not ceased. Such positions re-
emerged in the context of the shooting down of two aircraft by Cuba in 1996.86 In the wake of 
the tragic events of 11 September, 2001 a new form of misuse of civil aviation emerged as a 
tangible threat to national security: namely, civil aircraft being seized by non-state actors to 
endanger the lives of persons and property on the ground. This new phenomenon raised new 
questions and challenges in terms of the interpretation of relevant rules of international law 
pertaining to the use of force against civil aircraft. 
 
It has emerged from the state submissions analysed in this paper that the set of international 
rules applicable to the use of force against civil aircraft seem to exhibit dual characteristics 
whereby, on the one hand it is qualified as a prohibition of use of force between states under 
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter and on the other, as the relationship between a state and natural 
persons governed by human rights and humanitarian law.87 France—being one of the two 
original co-sponsors of what was to become Article 3 bis—indicated, during the negotiations, 
that the term use of force was taken from Article 2 of the UN Charter; this could only be that of 
Article 2 (4).88 Any reference to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter implies that the aircraft is an 
external symbol of the state of registry,89 although the actual operations of such an aircraft are 
not necessarily attributable to the state of registry under international law. From a different 
perspective, this interpretation apparently places the emphasis on the obligations of states to 
guarantee and promote the safe and orderly growth of civil aviation as spelt out in the Chicago 
Convention.90 The human rights aspect, on the other hand, is considered to be the duty of a state 
                                                          
http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1455266338894~249 (12 
February 2016). 
84 Milde, op.cit., p. 125. 
85 Fitzgerald, The use of force against civil aircraft: the aftermath of the KAL Flight 007 Incident, 22 Can. Y.B. 
Int’ L. 291 (1984), pp. 302-303. 
86 UN Security Council Press Release 27 July 1996 See for example statements made by Cuba, the Russian 
Federation and China. Russia and China abstained from adopting UNSC resolution 1067 (1996). 
http://www.un.org/press/en/1996/19960727.sc6247.html  (12 February 2016) 
87 One must note that various scholars consider reference to the United Nations Charter—and especially to Article 
2 (4) in Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention—to be based on a misinterpretation of the question of how a state 
should deal with civil aircraft. This being, in essence, one of the treatment of nationals/foreigners, and it should 
have been approached as such. See Bin Cheng, the Destruction of KAL Flight KE 007 and Article 3 bis of the 
Chicago Convention in Air Worthy, Liber Amicorum honouring professor I. H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1985, pp. 70-71. For an opposing view, which holds that the use of force against 
civil aircraft is indeed a breach of the general prohibition on the use of force in relations among states enshrined 
in Article 2 (4) the UN Charter, see Horn, op.cit., pp. 37-80.  
88 Doc 9438A25-Min EX/1 p. 8.  http://www.icao.int/Meetings/AMC/Pages/Archived-
Assembly.aspx?Assembly=a25 (14 February 2016). 
89 Tom Ruys, Armed attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter. Evolutions in Customary law and Practice, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 199-204. According to Ruys civil aircraft and ships may for certain 
purposes be considered an external manifestation of a state.  
90 See Preamble and Article 44 of the Chicago Convention (1944). The International Court of Justice in the Corfu 
Channel case concluded that the obligation of Albania to warn the approaching British warships of the imminent 
danger to which the minefield exposed them to were not only based on considerations of humanity, but among 
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to protect the lives of persons on board a civil aircraft. Of course, these two elements are closely 
interrelated, as states should refrain from the use of force against another state under Article 2 
(4) for purposes inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, including promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.91 This focus on the 
perspective of human rights and humanitarian law—including the observance of the principle 
of proportionality, understood in the strict sense of weighing the harm inflicted by a measure 
against the benefit gained—remains relevant in inter alia; providing certain rules and guidelines 
as to how to address the extremely complex instances where a civil aircraft is used as a weapon 
against civil targets on the ground.92 
 
                                                          
other considerations on the principle of the freedom of maritime communication [emphasis added].  ICJ Corfu 
Channel Case. Judgement of April 9th, 1949.I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4. p. 22. 
91 Majid, op.cit, p. 195.  
92 Gábor Sulyok, An assessment of the destruction of rogue civil aircraft under international law and constitutional 
law, Fundamentum 2005, pp.10, 12-13, 17-18, 23-24. http://www.fundamentum.hu/english-edition-
2005/cikk/assessment-destruction-rogue-civil-aircraft-under-international-law-and-co (15 February 
2016). Also German Constitutional Court, Judgment of the First Senate of 15 February 2006 on the basis of the 
oral hearing of 9 November 2005 – 1 BvR 357/05 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_1bvr035705en.html (15 February 2016). For an 
opposing view, concluding that there is no definitive international law, only some widely accepted norms that are 
restricted to certain conditions with respect to firing on civilian aircraft, see Foont, op.cit., p. 724.  
